TITLE TO GERMAN SHIPS SEIZED BY THE UNITED
STATES DURING THE WORLD- WAR.
That the United States acquired and was empowered to
take title to the former German vessels, seized in American
ports during the late war, can scarcely be gainsaid; but it would
appear that, "inthe light of the purpose of the Government to
act within the limitation of the principles of -international law," I
such title as was procured by it must he qualified by equitable
considerations under general public law, at least in this country;
otherwise, we must conclude that the enabling statutes are tinged
with unconstitutionality.
This vital consideration is somewhat obscured in a recent
decision of the Distiict Court for the Southern Distrit of New
York:"- the quite collateral issue being raised, whether title to
these ships vested by direct governmental action and legislaticn
in itself constitutional, :' notwithstanding the averred general
usage or law of nations to the contrary, implying the necessity
of prize proceedings in maritime seizures "jure bell." This objection was briefly disposed of in the holding of the Court: "International law will be enforced in our courts; but not in the
face of a collglitutiolialact of Coftgress," The larger issue, of
more momentouslinquiry and far-reaching consequence, Was not
whether a statute pursuant to the war powers of Congress must
be preferred- above the rule of the law of nations, which is readily admitted so far as- the statute concerns American citizens,
but whether an act of Congress, in derogation of the law and
usage of stations and tile treaties- of the Uihited Stafes affirm.irig its understandings, is constitutiont, if it operates to defeat
the legal and/or equitable title of aliens (though former enemies), guaranteed to,them by deed of the United States and its
expriess, contract aiming at perpetuity'anAd consisfent.: ith irter.
national law. Such a statute Cannot be constlitutional unless,
'MacLeod v. U, S., 229 U. S. 416r 434 (1912).
Littlejohn v. U. S., "The Gaelic Prince," D. C., S. D., N. Y., Jan. 23,
1923.
"Act of Congress, May i. i917; Executive Order, June 30, 1917.
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consistently with the law of nations, it be read to imply an obligation on the part of the United States to make restitution or
equitably to indemnify the injured individuals or the government
representing them.
Something of the foregoing would seem to have been sensed
by the Court in the case of Littlejohn & Co. v. United States of
America; 4 or it was apprehended that the question was not
concluded either by the plea to the jurisdiction or by the libellant's objection to the Government's procedure in taking'the
ships, for the Court swallows whole the allegation that prize
proceedings should have preceded the seizure; and falls back on
the recent treaty of peace with Germany, commenting that it
"would seem to confirm all departmental orders regarding the
transfer of German property," thus indicating that possibly
something further than the aforesaid acts of legislative and executive authority was necessary, or so contemplated to be, to
confirm the Government's tenure, or title, or both; at least, the
anxiety of the Department of State to conclude this treaty is
strongly evidential of something further being requisite. The
Court's obiter dictum might also have been a hint to Government council not to rely upon the theory of the Supreme Court's
decision in The Wcstern Maid, which presupposed absolute title
in the United States, and which theory has been the subject of
widespread dissent.'
One is compelled to think that the fundamental inquiry
should at least have been whether, as between the statute supplemented by the subsequent treaty of peace with Germany, and
the rule of international law calling for proceedings in prize,
"any other construction" remained, to quote Marshall in The
Charming Betsy, 6 than that which warranted the Court in adjudicating that a statute alleged to be in violation of international
law was paramount in obligation to it. While the conclusion
became unavoidable that the title of the United States to former
' See note 2, supra.'257 U. S. 419 (1921); see 56
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German shipping was perfect, complete and indefeasible, the
premises remain uncertain as to whether, under the circumstances, prize proceedings or, if not, then some further. equitable obligation in the United States must have ensued due
regard for the rute of the law of natiops.- Had, h,(wever, the
conflict of the statute, supplemented by the treaty, witl the
more fundamental modern usage of nations in respect to the
immunity of private, non-combatant enemy property from confiscation, been put in issue, the constitutionality of the statute
must have heen qualified, if rot imlpeached, except it have been
construed to inpfy ultimate restitution of this shipping, or equitable indemnification therefor, or reparation. That this construction must enter into the statute and equally into the treaty
appears to he beyond doubt: "as to such matters as were by the
Constitution committed to the custody of the Federal Government, there were applicable thereto the latt, of nations, the maritime law, the principles of equity and the common law," ' at
least (who will deny it?) as a principle of construction and ifiterpretation." The powers of Congress in peace and in war, as
well as the treaty authority, respond to the law of nations 'as
u nderstood in this country." While the obligation of strict perfprmance rnay be spspended during a national emergency, the
ultimate compensating obligation of the law of nations is not1 0
'The Supreme Court of the United States has held that under the Prussian treaties of 1799 and .t828 "the power of search and detention for improper practices of neutral shipping continued in time of peace even until
the clearance had actually been perfected and the vessel had entered upon
the voyage"; this without-prize proceedings but in the exercise of an inherent
Tight in the United States tinder the laW of nations, and "their contract with
the vessel not one . . . they held under the treaty by purchase at a
stipulated price." While this decision only touched the seizure and detention
clauses, limiting them to territorial waters and the high seas after voyage
commenced, it is observable that the treaties gave immunity from special and
bostile embargo, -but not -from general embargo in the sense of ordinary restyaint of princes contemplating reparations. (For full Aiscussion. vide i6
Ii-Nois L. REv., No. 3, "Embargoes and Detenti6ns under the early American Treaties.")
' Shiras, J;, in 'Murray y. Chicago & N. W. Rwy. Co., 92 Fed. 868
(1899).
'Vide 9 CALIFORNIA L. REv. 470.
It is axiomatic that no single nation can change the law of nations
adversely to 'its general moral, if not everywhere constitutional, obligation, an obligation by inherent limitation under the Federal Constitution;
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The major question then turns upon judicial construction
in a case of appropriate jurisdiction. It is by a "superintending judicial authority," said Mr. Justice Wilson," that the law
of nations and the treaties of the United States will be enforced,
and it is in this sense that the judicial power transcends "the
ordinary legislative and executive powers of the general government, and the powers which concern treaties." ",
If a case in admiralty may not be said to arise under the
Constitution," : neither may a case turning strictly upon the
binding effect of the laws of nature and of nations, international
law obligating the United States to the security of the alien's
individual right. If, as Marshall declared,' 4 cases within the
cognizance of the courts which arise under the Constitution
"are triable by a rule which exists independent of any act-of the
legislature or union. That rule is the common or- unwritten
law . . which pervades all America"; then, a case, arising
under the law of the sea and of nations approved by the Constitution and affirmed by treaty of the United States, must be determined wholly by international law. Any evidence that a
general right, derived from the Constitution "by the rigor of
the law of nations and the common law," is restrained by the
modern usage of nations rests in proof, dissented Story in
Brown v. United States,15 that "by the general consent of nations the usage asserted has become incorporated into the code
of public law." "' Marshall had held in the same case, that the
mitigations of the "rigid rule, which the humane and wise policy
and it is peculiarly the view of the common law that the municipal laws
of a country cannot change that which rests in the universal consent of
nations, particularly when stipulated for by treaty, "so as to bind the subjects of another nation." [Miller v. Ship Resolution, 2 Dallas 1, 4 (187 );
see also The Scotia, 14 Wall. (U. S.) 170, 187 (1871) ; The Paquete Habana,
175 U. S. 677, 711 (goo); see also the Insular cases, Downes v. Bidwell,
etc.}
.Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dallas (U. S.) 419, 466 (1793).
"Ibid. p. 425; Cooley, Const. Law (3 ed. 1898), p. x23.
'Marshall in Ins. Co. v.Canter, i Peters (U. S.) 5ii, 546 (t828).
"Journal, House of Delegates, Virginia, Jan. 22, 1799, P. 90, from cer-
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L. REv. 43-44; Brown v. U. S., note 15 supra.

TITLE TO SEIZED GERMAN SHIPS

of nations has introduced" (against confiscations of private
property) "into the practice of nations, though they will more
or less affect the exercise of this right, cannot impair the right
itself." Of this, Prof. John Bassett Moore comments: "I "The
supposition that usage may render unlawful the exercise of a
right, but cannot impair the right itself, is at variance with
sound theory." Marshall later abandoned his preconceptions,
holding in United Slates v. Perchemnan 18 "that the modern usage
of nations, which has become law," constrained the United States
and its courts.19
This doctrine ultimately adopted by Marshall applies to the
immediate inquiry, whether the securities afforded by the early
Prussian treaties are of such character as to constrain the Federal Courts, in the course of appropriate judicial proceedings, to
read into the construction of war-time acts of Congress and the
treaty of peace their understandings: Article XXIV of the Prussian Treaty of 1799 with the United States notably stipulates:
"It is declared that neither the pretense that war dissolves all treaties, nor any other schatever, shall be considered as annulling or suspending this and the next preceding
article; but, on the contrary that the state of war is precisely that for which they are provided, and during which
they are to be as sacredly observed as the most acknowledged articles in the lawu of nature and of nations."
Article XXIII touches and concerns the property of "merchants
of either country, then residing in the other" and "in general, all
others whose occupations are for the common subsistence and
benefit of mankind." "The permission of trade" (maritime
commerce) "is for the interest of human society," declares MalCharacter and Judicial Services, Vol. i, p. 526.
" Dillon: Marshall, Life,
1"7 Peters (U. S.) ix (1833); v4de, also, Dillon, note 17 supra.
" Thus, he holds the eighth article of the Treaty of St. Ildefonso "must
be intended to stipulate expressly for the security to private property, which
the laws and usages of nations without express stipulation would have con-

ferred . . . no construction, which would impair that security further
than its positive words require, u'ozdd seem to be admissible . . . the

titles of individuals . . . so far as they were consummated, might be
asserted in the courts of the United States independently of this article . . .
the construction which we now give the article must enter into the construction of acts of Congress on the subject."
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Then the domiciliary objection is substantially foreclosed.

so far as concerni the privately'German-owned merchant marine
in American ports at the beginning of the war; and the still
larger security as to property within American territory finds
support in Marshall's comment, in the famous debate in the case
of Jonathan Robins: 21 "A case in law and equity proper for
judicial determination may arise under a treaty, where the rights
of individuals are to be defended in court, as under the fourth
and sixth articles of the treaty of peace with Great Britain. or
under those articles of our late treaties with France, Prussia.
and other nations, which secure to the subjects of those nations.
their property within the United States."
But whatever doubt may exist on this point, as to the restricted effect of the Prussian treaty's stipulations for the event
of war, would appear to be removed when Marshall's opinion in
United States s, Percheman 22 is examined in the light of Pollard v. Kibbe,2' evidencing that the principle of the security of
private property taken by conquest had been consecrated by "the
usage of the civilized world," and that Marshall's decision in
Foster sv. Neilson,2 4 in part reversed by the Perchenit.case,afforded no basis for the pretension that it controverted or abrogated that principle, though silent on the question.
Further, it is very important to distinguish between the
continuing obligation of treaties affirming new understandings
of the law of nations and those which, in respect of legislative
modification and repeal, are within the power of Congress. - :Hamilton writes: "Treaty stipulations, which are designed to
operate in case of war. preserve their force and obligations when
war takes place," 0 and "our treaties and the law of nations form
De Jure .Maritimo et Navali, Vol. 2, Chap. XVI
'House of Rep. of Congress, 'March 4, i8oo.

(1769).

Note 18 supra.

='4 Peters (U. S.) 353, 402 (1840) ; see also 7

1INNE5SOTA L. REV. 113.

"Treaties 'Made or Which Shall Be Made under the Authority of the United
States."

Peters (U. S.) 243 (1824).
"IVide fMINXESOTA L. REv., note 23 supra.
"M5 Hamilton's Works (Lodge ed.) z26.
"2
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a part of the law of the land"; ', "-n established rule of tie

law of nations can only be altered by agreements btween all the
civilized powers, or by a new usage. generally adopted and sanctioned by time." 2M Marshall declared in The Society for the
Propagation of the Gospel v. Ne-aw Haven: - "We think that
treaties stipulating for permanent rights and general arrangements and professing to aim at perpetuity. and to deal with the
case of war as of peace, are at most only suspended while it
lasts; and unless they are wvaied by the parties, or new and replugliant stipulations are made. they revive in their operation at
the return of peace."
"That treaties may amount to a law of nations follows
from the definition of that law." 3 If such be their nature,
their legislative modification or repeal finds positive limitation,
and this whether they be considered as repealing or affirming the
general law, making exceptions to it. which .are to constitute a
particular law, or whether explanatory of the law of nations, "in
which case they are first a law between the parties themselves,
and next a sanction to the general law, according to the reasonableness of the explanation and the number and character of
the parties." 3- Judicial power and cognizance in the Federal
Courts must on the one hand operate to constrain legislative
enactment with respect to their modification or repeal, and, on
the other, in case of appropriate jurisdiction, serve to determine
the constitutionality of the act of government in question. Such
treaties clearly transcend the purposes of ordinary domestic
legislation and call to their aid the totality of subsisting authorities under the Constitution. They must offer a reasonable and
lawful exception to the rule that treaties conferring private rights
"of a nature to be enforced in courts of notice and which furnish, in cases other-wisc cog;dzable in such courts, rules of decision, are subject to such act as Congress may pass for their
IT4

Hamilton's Works (Lodge ed.) 146 ("Pacificus").

S5 Hamilton's Works (Lodge ed.)
2

218.

'8"Wheat. (U. S.) 464. 494 (1823).
W2 Madison's Works 260o. published by order of Congress.
Note 3o supra.
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enforcement, modification or repeal." 32 Treaties stipulating
for rights or establishing a usage consistent with the law of
modern usage of nations and those principles which lie at the
foundation of our jurisprudence, if obligatory on the courts,"
cannot be less obligatory on the political branches of the Government, or, 'o say the least, upon officers of the United States
acting under statutes contravening their understandings.
No waiver of permanent rights granted by the early treaties
with Prussia can, in fact, be admitted under recent agreements
with Germany. The obligation of the early American treaties,
assuring, in effect, the restitution as well as the security of private enemy-owned property upon the coming of peace, is not voidable by act even of a foreign sovereign; nor is such act adequate authority to release the United States from its immediate
duty under the general usage and law of nations as to post
belun, possession. " The juris et scishae conjunctlo of the
United States, however valid by authority of war-time powers,
or contingently extended, as is the popular conception, 'by the
treaty of peace with Germany, must consist with the equitable
obligation of the United States to fulfill its undertakings under
the- aforementioned clauses of the early Prussian treaties, not
abrogated by the existence of war. All mention of these-treaties was scrupulously avoided by the framers of the more recent
treaty of peace and executive agreement with Germany. Does
a title, acquired by a seizure in time of war, and good, as the
Federal District Court has recently held, require that the German Government shall render it more valid by formal assent,
or ratify, as the Senate ratifies a treaty?
Under the treaty of peace with Germany;36 the satisfaction
of all private American claims against Germany, etc., and the
Confirming to the United States all "seizures" imposed or -made
"Head Money Case, 112 U. S. 580 (1884); Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U. S. 190 (1887).

'C. J. ,farshall in The Peggy, i Cranch (U. S.)
"Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch (U. S.) 87 (i8io).
" Vide 55 A.mmscA-. L. REv. 877.
'Aug. 25, 1921.
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by the United States during the war, are the salient and express
conditions upon which turns the retention of German property
in the possession or control of the United States. There is the
further condition that, by reference to the treaty of Versailles,.
should these conditions not be fulfilled, and confiscatidn ensue,
Germany will indemnify her citizens pursuant to the understandings of that treaty; but this indemnification in practice has
proven so far from-equitable as to amount to confiscation. If, as
they must, treaties of the United States are to be construed in
the light of the law of nations, the peace treaty with Germany,
and, indeed, the ultimate authority to deal with the aforesaid
property is found to be constrained by principles of international
law affirmed by prior American treaties. Upon principle, "a
party to a contract cannot pronounce its own deed invalid, although that party be a sovereign state." -I- While the early
Prussian treaties may have been abrogated by the war-not so
their securities. It will be admitted "that a right once vested
doe4 not require for its preservation the continued existence of
the power by which it was acquired. If a treaty or any other law
has performed its office by giving a right, the expiration of the
treaty or law cannot extinguish the right."' 8 The rights of
Germans, whose property has been taken by the United States,are within the protection of the Constitution and the law of
nations as understood in this country, and any treaty of the
United States, law or act of executive authority must contemplate their security. The custodia legis of the United States is
subject to the principle "reintegrandasunt omnia spoliato antequain procedatur idterius '
Joseph IVhitla Stinson.
New York City.
Copyright 1923.
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